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Competition in the food marketing chain
{
Garry Gri¤th*
Competition in the Australian food marketing chain is of continuing concern, but
little evidence is available to guide policy debate. In a search for broad guidelines,
the theoretical and empirical evidence is reviewed and the recent report of the Joint
Select Committee on the Retailing Sector is examined. Then publicly available data
on several food groups are used to test for evidence of persistent market power.
The purchasing behaviour of the grains and oilseeds processing sector is found to
warrant more detailed attention. A possible research agenda and a call for greater
attention to data requirements complete the article.
1. Introduction
Whether or not the Australian food marketing chain is competitive or,
conversely, whether market power exists in the chain, has been an issue of
concern to farmers and policy-makers for most of this century. Indeed, the
incentive for the establishment of marketing boards for primary products
was partly the fear that farmers were at the mercy of powerful buyers who
had the ability to earn supernormal pro¢ts.
This concern has heightened in recent years for a number of reasons. First,
the data show that food product marketing margins have increased over
time, and especially in the last decade or so. Retail prices have increased
more rapidly than farm prices, and the farmer's share has declined (see, for
example, ¢gures 1 and 2 for two quite di¡erent products, beef and bananas.
For a perspective using monthly beef data, see Chang and Gri¤th 1998,
¢gure 1). Many agricultural producers still view these trends as evidence of
non-competitive behaviour in the processing and marketing chain, even
though the factors determining the size of marketing margins are well known
(TomekandRobinson 1990;Campbell andFisher1982),namely,the extensive
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK or 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 44:3, pp. 333^367
{This article is a revised version of my Presidential Address to the 44th Annual
Conference of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, University of
Sydney, 22^25 January 2000. Important contributions to this article have been made by
Roley Piggott, John Nightingale, Chris O'Donnell, John Mullen, an anonymous referee and
participants at a NSW Agriculture seminar. I am grateful to Robyn Hean and Debbie Hill
for assistance with compiling the data and the Rural Industries Research and Development
Corporation for ¢nancial assistance.
*Garry Gri¤th is a Principal Research Scientist with NSW Agriculture, located at the
Beef Industry Centre, the University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351.Figure 1 Nominal retail and farm beef prices, 1970^97

































# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000range of activities that can be involved in converting raw farm products
into products demanded by consumers, and compensation for risk bearing
by marketing ¢rms.
The range of services provided by the food marketing chain and how the
chain is managed have undergone signi¢cant change recently in response to
major social and cultural changes among consumers. These have been well
documented by Kinsey et al. (1996) and the ACCC (1999) among others.
Increasing requirements for quality assurance, extended shopping hours,
ready-to-eat meals and eating food away from home are all manifestations of
income growth, time-constrained households and more discerning consumers.
Food marketing ¢rms, sometimes acting in response to consumer preferences
and sometimes of their own volition, play an important role in determining
what is actually produced on farms. It is now often a case of retailers `pulling'
a product with appropriate characteristics out of the system in response to
consumer preferences, in contrast to past practices of agricultural producers
`pushing' a product into the chain at discount prices. The cost of providing
these new sorts of marketing services is a rapidly growing source of growth in
marketing margins and in the ¢nal price for the product paid by consumers.
Second, the marketing board system in many States has been progressively
dismantled with the elimination in many industries of guaranteed farm prices,
production quotas, vesting and single desk selling arrangements. This process
has been more keenly focused over the past ¢ve years or so under the
legislative requirements of National Competition Policy, where all regulations
relating to agricultural product markets must be reviewed. For the regulations
to remain in force, a net social bene¢t test must be passed. My involvement
in several of these reviews indicated that the issue of non-competitive
marketing chains was a crucial part of the deliberations about the distribution
of the potential bene¢ts of deregulation and of the argument for the
maintenance of regulations at the farm gate as a form of countervailing power
(see, in particular, NSW Government Review Group 1997). Various review
teams have sought the advice of economists in relation to these matters, but
little empirical evidence has been available to help resolve them.
Third, and associated with both the reform process in domestic agri-
cultural markets and the increasing globalisation of food markets under
World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements, there has been an increase in
takeover and merger proposals as ¢rms position themselves to take
advantage of the new marketing environment. Examples include the
rationalisation of meat processing capacity, including the growth of foreign
ownership (Rolfe and Reynolds 1999), the rationalisation of fresh milk
processing (Hughes 2000), and takeovers of smaller independent food
retailers by the major chains. This activity has seen the well-documented
increases in the shares of various markets achieved by the larger ¢rms. For
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the three large retail chains in the dry grocery sector from around 40 per cent
in 1975 to just under 80 per cent in 1998. Such data have been used by some
to explain the increase in marketing margins as noted above.
The ACCC is required to assess the competitive implications of merger
proposals, but since it is primarily an investigation and enforcement institution
and not a research institution, it must rely on published evidence, as well as
its own investigations, to make such assessments (ACCC 1999, p. 5). While the
ACCC does use rules of thumb in deciding on whether to mount an
investigation, senior members of the ACCC have expressed the need for a
better ¢lter so that investigative resources are not wasted on low-risk proposals
and more detailed case study assessments can be undertaken on those
proposals considered to be higher risk (Rhonda Smith, pers. comm. 1999).
Fourth, the issue of the competitive structure of the marketing chain is
also important for studies on the returns to R&D and promotion, especially
in estimating the distribution of potential bene¢ts to di¡erent sectors of the
market and in recommending investments funded by various producer levy
or check-o¡ schemes. Alston et al. (1995) cover these issues in detail while a
recent empirical example is given by Cran¢eld and Goddard (1999).
There is also public concern in Australia about the issue of competition in
the food chain as evidenced by the recent Joint Select Committee on the
Retailing Sector (Australian Parliament 1999). The structure of food retailing
and the agricultural marketing board system also received attention in the
recently completed Productivity Commission report on the impacts of National
Competition Policy on rural and regional Australia (Productivity Commission
1999). However, in spite of this public concern and the growing policy
requirements for empirical evidence, the competitive structure of the food chain
has not been a favoured topic among Australian economists in recent years.
Little notice has been taken of Richardson's (1986) call for greater attention to
be given to imperfect competition or the role of agribusiness ¢rms (see also
NSW Farmers' Association 1998). And it is not as though the potential cost of
non-competitive behaviour in the Australian food marketing chain is insigni-
¢cant:
1 a market power surcharge of the size found in the United States would
produce a deadweight loss to the economy of at least A$20 million per year.
1ABS data reported by Australian Parliament (1999, p. 7) indicate annual retail
expenditure on food products of more than A$56 billion. Given a relatively inelastic
aggregate domestic demand for food, say ÿ0.5; a very elastic aggregate supply of food; and
food price indexed to 100 and food quantity indexed at 56; a market power reduction in
equilibrium food production of only 1.5^1.8 per cent (Marion et al. 1979b; Park and
Weliwite 1999) would produce a reduction in surplus to Australian consumers of over A$1
billion per year including a deadweight loss to the economy of about A$20 million per
year.
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for example, there are several research centres focusing on this issue and it
is an item of ongoing concern for various government agencies (see, for
example, USDA 1996). The American Journal of Agricultural Economics has
contained many articles in recent volumes on this topic, including invited
paper sessions at the annual meetings (for example, Rogers and Sexton
1994). In Europe, although there are fewer published research studies, there
has been a recent O¤ce of Fair Trading inquiry into supermarket con-
centration in the United Kingdom and this matter has been referred to the
Competition Commission (OFT 1999). The OECD (1997) recently reviewed
the impact of regulations on the distribution sector and, in particular, the
regulation of supermarket sites. Market power in the food chain is a world-
wide policy issue (ACCC 1999).
It is against this background, and the greater focus on prices at all market
levels with GST just around the corner, that the issue of competition in the
Australian food marketing chain is addressed in this article. The article is
structured as follows. The next two sections are very condensed summaries
of a review of various theoretical and applied studies of competitive structures
of food markets. Then follow sections summarising the main points from
the recent Senate inquiry on the retail sector and the Productivity
Commission inquiry on the impacts of National Competition Policy on rural
and regional Australia. These four sections contain some of the material also
reported in Gri¤th et al. (1999).
2 The broad conclusions from the material
reviewed are that (a) little guidance is available from the literature for
policy-makers, and (b) considerable resources in the form of detailed case
studies are required to properly examine the competitive structure of any
given market. Some broad-brush empirical work is then attempted which
seeks to separate the more competitive from the less competitive and so
provide a focus for more detailed case studies of those markets where
concern is warranted. In conclusion, implications for the profession are
presented including aspects of a possible research agenda and a call for
greater attention to the data needed for such analyses.
2. Insights from economic theory
In this section `market power' is de¢ned and then some of the strands of
economic theory relating to the concept are identi¢ed. In principle, one could
review at least a couple of centuries of writings by economists about market
power and, of course, there are many di¡erent points of view. Nevertheless,
2Longer versions of these reviews are available from the authors.
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Because of the enormous literature that exists, little attention is given to
particular studies. Similarly the `textbook' theoretical cases are taken as
read.
2.1 De¢ning market power
The de¢nition of market power is often unclear in economic theory. One
recent de¢nition that has been used by the ACCC (1999, p. 26) is `the ability
of a ¢rm to behave persistently in a manner di¡erent from the behaviour that
a competitive market would enforce on a corporation facing otherwise
similar cost and demand conditions'. This would include the ability to raise
selling prices and depress input prices, to deter entry, to re-distribute pro¢ts
to oneself from other ¢rms and, importantly, to be able to sustain these
bene¢ts over time. This last point is most important. If a ¢rm takes
advantage of a temporary situation of power, it will have less e¡ect on the
well-being of other buyers and/or sellers than would a permanent advantage.
It could be said that ¢rm decisions are a continual e¡ort to make the best
of the present situation. Only if the advantage stays with one ¢rm, or set of
¢rms, is the market frustrated in allocating resources e¤ciently.
2.2 The structure^conduct^performance (SCP) framework
The SCP model discussed in texts on industrial organisation theory (for
example, Scherer and Ross 1990) provides a means of examining market
power in various institutional settings. Porter's concept of competitive
advantage (see Porter 1998) gives the SCP framework a managerial focus.
General statements about market power can be made using the SCP
framework, such as relatively weak inferences that barriers to entry and exit
are important to long-run pro¢tability of an industry. Unfortunately, many
of these barriers are actually created by rivalry between ¢rms. Such factors
as product innovation, proprietary cost-reducing innovations and resulting
price advantages over potential entrants, are simply part of the competitive
process. Judging that a competitive process has the result of entrenching
market power is not easy. Advertising and marketing are also di¤cult to
categorise as either worthwhile rivalry resulting in consumer bene¢ts on the
one hand, or something that merely raises barriers by increasing the size of
the sunk costs of entry into the market. Researchers have to examine cases
closely to come to conclusions about the net bene¢ts to society of these forms
of competition. In the present context, the SCP framework merely provides
a means of ordering information requirements for case studies of the food
marketing chain.
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concerning thresholds on market shares and the like which indicate their
view of the relationship between structure and performance. For example,
the ACCC (1999, pp. 27^8) state that a share of a merged ¢rm exceeding
15 per cent in a market where the four-¢rm concentration ratio is 75 per cent
or more, or a share of a merged ¢rm exceeding 40 per cent no matter what
the distribution of other ¢rms, will be cause for further investigation. Rogers
and Sexton (1994, p. 1144) indicate that a four-¢rm concentration ratio of
50 per cent is `a commonly used benchmark for separating markets into
workable competition and non-competitive groups'. In a related vein, Rolfe
and Reynolds (1999) quote a number of studies which suggest that e¡ective
oligopolistic coordination tends to break down with three or more ¢rms. Of
course the way in which `the market' is de¢ned, in terms of product, regional
and/or temporal aggregation, in£uences the usefulness of such guidelines.
It is to be expected that ¢nancially powerful ¢rms will invest in directions
that will enhance their position. Recent contributions to industrial organisa-
tion theory make much of the strategic aspects of ¢rm decisions. Strategic
decisions can be identi¢ed by the e¡ect they will have on raising further
barriers to entry. The main evidence is that ¢rms invest in directions that
increase the level of sunk costs required for pro¢table operation. One
example is investment in ¢rm-speci¢c network capital goods, such as Just-In-
Time delivery systems, that have to be implemented backwards in the supply
chain. Another example is the current scramble by the major food retail
chains to secure supermarket sites ahead of the announced entry by the
German company Aldi (Mitchell 1999).
2.3 New institutional economics
The analysis of contracts, an item of some concern in the recent retail sector
inquiry, is dealt with by transactions costs economics and principal-agent
relationships. Putterman and Krosner (1996) reproduce some of the im-
portant papers in this tradition and Williamson (1999) provides a recent and
detailed review. Agency problems exist where two parties to a transaction
have di¡erent goals, or di¡erent information, and are intent on achieving
their own goals regardless of other parties. These problems can be found in
transactions between ¢rms, as when a producer and a buyer have di¡erent
perceptions of the situation. The producer may know something about the
quality of the product which is unknown to the buyer; the buyer may know
something about the market in which the transaction is taking place which
the producer does not know. This is known as information asymmetry.
Either may hide information from the other to achieve their goals. Similar
problems may be seen within an organisation when, for example, the goal of
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strategic management goals of the supermarket focus on long-term supplier
loyalty.
Agency and transactions costs problems can help explain particular
organisational forms and structures. The nature of ¢rms, alliances, franchises,
contractual arrangements, markets and of all the various forms they take, is
an outcome of economising choice. The ¢rm is organised to enforce per-
formance by opportunistic input suppliers in a context of information
asymmetry, where no single entity can observe all aspects of performance.
According to the literature in this area, the institution of the ¢rm, and its
¢nancing, are a result of a choice of institutional form to minimise the costs of
monitoring performance. The relevance to the food distribution chain is clear:
many types of relationships can be observed in that chain, from vertical
integration to arm's length markets. Independent retail stores band together
in marketing groups, often coordinated by a wholesaler. Retail chain stores
integrate some functions but outsource others; they also have contractual
relationships of various kinds, formal and informal, with their suppliers. `Own
brand' producers are tied to retail chains or wholesalers by contracts which
vary in the exclusiveness they demand of the producers. Processors and
manufacturers also integrate backwards and horizontally to form the large,
sometimes multinational, grocery and commodity companies. They also have
supply contracts with farmers and other suppliers which are not simple arm's
length market relationships but have a long life, and expectations on both
sides of continuity, no matter whether they are more or less informal.
Problems in these relationships are suggested by some of the submissions
to the recent retail sector inquiry. Contractual relationships between growers
and processors or retailers vary in formality from mere handshakes to
detailed legal agreements. In both cases there have been assertions of
agreements being interpreted or varied in favour of the party with the greater
¢nancial power, be it a chicken processor or a retail chain. These agreements
and their evolution may be interpreted as a market response to a need for
two things. The ¢rst is e¤ciency improvement (Just-In-Time and Total
Quality Management are two slogans used in this regard). The second is for
the `market makers' to construct a system which serves their needs in terms
of allocating risk, preserving proprietary knowledge advantages and avoiding
adverse selection of subsidiary network members. For example, an agree-
ment between a retail chain and a broccoli grower may be silent on the
question of whether the grower's price can be decreased because of
marketing e¡ort (e.g., discounting) on the part of the supermarket. Evidence
was submitted to the retail sector inquiry that the grower's price was
discounted by the retailer when the retail price was discounted without
consultation with the grower (NFF 1999 and QFVG 1999). Does this
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shifting of pro¢ts? Analysis of the agency relationships involved, in con-
junction with production technologies, should allow a statement about
whether the practice is merely the exercise of market power or the adjust-
ment to more economically or technically e¤cient production.
2.4 Evolutionary economics
Another strand of knowledge about market behaviour which is of relevance
to the food marketing chain is that broadly known as the `evolutionary
economics of markets', or `the resource-based theory of business strategy'.
Writers in this area include Penrose (1959), Anso¡ (1965), Nelson and Winter
(1982) and Nightingale (1996). Knowledge is central to these theories; the
knowledge of how to produce and market outputs. This is specialised to the
¢rm in question according to this literature. Each ¢rm has its own ¢ne
variant on doing what it does, even within a seemingly homogeneous
industry. Knowledge advantages create the pro¢t the ¢rm can make. If all
knowledge were public, above-normal pro¢ts could not be sustained and the
competitive process would immediately grind all activity to a stagnant
equilibrium in which no further investment or innovation would be under-
taken. Private knowledge drives entrepreneurial activity, but private know-
ledge also leads to the potential for the exploitation of market power. Thus
we see that market power and the competitive process may be considered to
be interdependent, or symbiotic, both being outcomes of the drive for pro¢t
that is the central feature of modern economies.
The observation that pro¢t rate and other performance variables di¡er
more between ¢rms than between industries gives some indication of the
importance of private knowledge in the capitalist system (Scherer and Ross
1990, p. 650). Not all orthodox economic theories cope well with this
observation, whereas evolutionary or resource advantage theories expect this
to be the case, and explain why it is so.
The relevance of these ideas to the present context is in the growth and
technological development of the food marketing chain. The investment in
innovation, and its di¡usion, which drives the ¢rm in its quest for long-run
pro¢t and growth, are possible only where the ¢rm is su¤ciently pro¢table
and su¤ciently pressed by forces of competitive rivalry. These two con-
ditions, the ¢nancial resources and the incentive, are the product of market
processes, the selection mechanism transferring market share from the less
e¤cient to the more e¤cient, and the innovation mechanism generating new
varieties of technologies and products. Concentration increases if e¤cient
¢rms continue to accrete market share without check from innovative moves
by previously less e¤cient ¢rms or from entrants.
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predictable for most periods of time, as ¢rms search for new e¤ciencies
within their existing technologies. This means it is possible to make reason-
ably ¢rm predictions about general directions for growth, within a context of
technological forecasting. What is not possible is to predict change that is
radically creative. We can be sure there will be such change sometime in the
future, and that it is likely to be associated with successful entry or the
equivalent of entry by reconstruction of an existing ¢rm. The last time the
food chain was subject to such a change within Australia was the entry of
the variety chain stores, Woolworths and Coles, into grocery retailing in the
early 1960s. Before that, the cut-price self-service methods of Flemings,
Franklins and Tom the Cheap Grocer, to name the three most `notorious'
players, transformed the way groceries were sold in Australia during the
1950s. Even these changes were, at the time, generally predicted from
knowledge of retailing elsewhere in the world. The manner by which well-
regarded senior executives move between ¢rms is an example of the value
¢rms place on human capital and the potential for innovative decision-
making.
In the coming decade the predictable trajectories of change include e-
commerce, global horizontal integration of retailing systems and tighter
vertical links in the supply chain, the latter change causing most angst for
suppliers in Australia. Further entry to food retailing is likely to occur by
¢rms with innovative ways of responding to these changes, but the possible
outcomes are much less certain.
2.5 Conclusions from theory
To sum up, economic theory does not suggest any one `blueprint' to explain
the presence and extent of market power. Rather, it suggests some things
to look for which might be conducive to ¢rms being able to earn above-
normal pro¢ts for a sustained period of time. These include high levels of
sunk costs, particularly those associated with marketing, and asymmetric
information. The presence and extent of market power have to be assessed
on a case-by-case basis. Some ¢rm characteristics such as innovative £air
(cost-reducing technologies and new product development) are a means by
which ¢rms can make above-normal pro¢ts over a relatively short period of
time. But these characteristics are not only desirable in the eyes of
consumers but are essential to a capitalist economy. The point of
contention in most of these theories is the di¤culty of distinguishing types
of behaviour which are manifestations of the `normal' competitive process
from types of behaviour which are the concern of the regulatory
authorities.
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In the previous section some of the general strands in the theoretical
literature and the insights they give us about competitive structures were
identi¢ed. In this section speci¢c empirical studies are reviewed, but again
the literature is voluminous and in what follows only a sample of studies are
cited. In particular, the literature on marketing margins per se is not covered,
although both the theoretical (see, for example, Gardner 1975) and empirical
studies in this area (see for example George and King 1971; Gri¤th 1974;
Wohlgenant and Mullen 1987; Lyon and Thompson 1993) have implications
for the competitive structures of the markets of interest. This topic has been
recently and comprehensively reviewed by Wohlgenant (1999).
3.1 Traditional structure^conduct^performance studies
There has been a huge number of empirical studies aimed at ¢nding a
relationship between structural characteristics of industries and pro¢t levels.
Pro¢t measures were typically accounting pro¢t rates or price-cost margins.
Structural characteristics of industries were typically four-¢rm or eight-¢rm
concentration ratios, with controls for other elements of industry structure
(and conduct). As early as 1974, Weiss (1974, p. 193) conjectured that the
relationship between pro¢ts and industry structure `must be one of the most
thoroughly tested hypotheses in economics by now'.
Weiss (1974) tabulated 46 mainly manufacturing sector-wide studies and
cited another eight (his Table 11). He concluded that the large majority of
studies showed a signi¢cant positive e¡ect of concentration on pro¢ts or
margins, and that this relationship was quite robust across di¡erent time
frames, countries, measures of structure and performance, other variables
controlled for, units of observation, data sets and data sources. North
American sector-wide studies along the same lines but completed after the
earlier Weiss survey, say in the period 1975^85, generally con¢rm the earlier
¢ndings (Weiss 1990).
A reasonable number of studies examined the structure-performance link
speci¢cally for the food chain. In an oft-cited study, Collins and Preston
(1966) analysed cross-section data for 32 US food manufacturing industries
and concluded that average industry price-cost margins were positively
related to the degree of concentration. They found this relationship to be
continuous and non-linear.
Several studies during this period examined performance in food retailing.
In a major study, Marion et al. (1979a) used quarterly data on the net pro¢ts
and grocery prices of 17 large US food chains to examine the e¡ects of
concentration on price and pro¢t performance. They found both net pro¢ts
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and market shares, irrespective of the form of concentration ratios used.
Their conclusion was that the higher observed pro¢ts were largely due to the
higher prices chains were able to charge in less competitively structured
markets, not to greater e¤ciency and lower costs. In a related report, Marion
et al. (1979b) estimated the monopoly surcharge attributable to these higher
prices. They found an average surcharge of about 1.5 per cent in the 31
regional markets that they studied, but the surcharge reached almost 7 per
cent in some markets.
A rather dated, but still often cited, SCP study on the exercise of market
power in US markets for fruits and vegetables reminds us that supply
responsiveness at the farm level is a crucial determinant of the incentive for
collusive buying behaviour (see Helmberger and Hoos 1965, pp. 129^30):
Greater elasticity in the supply function tends to decrease the di¡erence
between average and marginal resource cost and facilitates independent
conduct in the sense that output variation on the part of any one ¢rm [read
buyer] will tend to have a correspondingly smaller impact on price.
But there is another sense in which supply responsiveness at the farm level
is of interest. The more responsive is supply, the greater the ease with which
resources can be diverted to other uses. A buyer's ability to force down
farm-level prices is inversely related to the degree of supply response. The
general ¢nding from the Helmberger and Hoos study was that farmers,
through their co-operative bargaining associations, have more likelihood of
gaining lasting bene¢ts if they concentrate their e¡orts on negotiating non-
price terms of trade, such as delivery methods, time of payment and quality
measurement.
Several Australian studies in the 1960s and 1970s followed the US
literature and examined the standard concentration-pro¢ts relationship in
the context of the domestic manufacturing sector. Again, most were at the
sector-wide level. For example, Round (1975) found an insigni¢cant relation-
ship between average industry pro¢t and concentration in 33 Australian
manufacturing industries. However, his ¢ndings also gave support to the
hypothesis that, in any particular industry, rates of return were higher in
large ¢rms because of greater e¤ciency, rather than collusive conduct or
abuse of market power.
In the case of Australian food industries, only a few studies of the
relationship between pro¢tability and industry structure have been under-
taken. Gri¤th and Gill (1984) investigated whether the changing structure of
pigmeat marketing in the early 1980s had any impact on pigmeat price
spreads. Concentration variables were not found to have any consistent or
signi¢cant separate impact on price spreads in pigmeat marketing. In a
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of beef sold by supermarkets relative to butcher shops in NSW, as a measure
of increasing concentration in meat retailing, was able to explain any of the
increase in the beef farm-retail price spread. The concentration variable
generally was found to be statistically insigni¢cant.
3.2 New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) studies
The focus of the NEIO literature is on the conduct of ¢rms within a
particular industry, where the industry is allowed to depart from the
competitive model. Two important concepts in these studies are `conjectural
elasticities', which refer to assumptions a single ¢rm makes about how other
¢rms in the industry will respond to changes it makes in output volumes or
input purchases, and `e¡ective' marginal revenue and/or marginal factor
cost, which allows divergence from the standard price equals marginal cost
¢rst-order condition.
Bresnahan (1989) compared the estimated price-cost margins from various
US and Canadian studies which used this approach. These studies covered
manufacturing, retail and service industries. The estimated price-cost margins
ranged from about 5 per cent to about 90 per cent. He drew three con-
clusions from that review: (a) there is a great deal of market power, in the
sense of high price-cost margins, in some concentrated industries; (b) one
signi¢cant cause of high price-cost margins is anti-competitive conduct (some
of the studies found conduct well towards the collusive end of the spectrum,
but there were substantial di¡erences between ¢rms in some industries); and
(c) only a very little has been learned from the NEIO methods about the
relationship between market power and industrial structure (that is, most
studies have focused on the concentrated end of the industrial spectrum, and
even though market power can now be more easily and consistently
measured, we still don't know very much about its causes).
There have been many US studies using these methods with a direct focus
on agriculture/food markets. With respect to food processing, the meat
packing sector has been the focus of a substantial amount of research activity
in the last decade or so. Many studies found market power in the purchase
of ¢nished cattle and/or in the sale of packed beef but very recent research
casts doubt on these ¢ndings (Muth and Wohlgenant 1999a, 1999b). More-
over, Paul (1999a, 1999b) stressed the need for a rigorous treatment of the
cost structure of the industry when attempting to measure market power
e¡ects. She concludes:
Increasing concentration in the US meat packing industry seems justi¢ably
to have emerged from cost economies, which appear in turn to be
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products rather than generating excessive pro¢ts for the plants or ¢rms.
(Paul 1999a, p. 629)
With speci¢c regard to food retailing, Holloway (1991) found no major
departures from competition in the whole farm-retail marketing chain for
eight major US food groups, Ailawadi et al. (1995) found no concrete
evidence con¢rming an increase in market power exercised or accumulated
by grocery retailers, and Messinger and Narasimhan (1995) found that
neither accounting nor stock market data clearly indicated a shift in channel
pro¢tability from manufacturers to retailers.
In the most recent and most rigorous treatment, Park and Weliwite
(1999) use aggregate retail industry data obtained from o¤cial and trade
sources to examine whether there has been any evidence of market power in
US food retailing. They ¢nd price taking behaviour in US food retailing
prior to 1983, but some evidence of market power since then following an
increase in merger activity.
The UK O¤ce of Fair Trading has recently completed an inquiry into
food retailing (OFT 1999). On the basis of their ¢ndings, the O¤ce has
referred a formal competition inquiry to the Competition Commission. The
four reasons given for the referral were that the level of pro¢tability of the
four largest chains was high, that there were signi¢cant barriers to new
competitors, that grocery prices were often set to match competitors rather
than to undercut them, and that suppliers, including agricultural producers,
were adversely a¡ected.
In a study of the Australian meat industry, Hyde and Perlo¡ (1998) found
that the domestic retail meat market was competitive for beef, lamb and
pork and that market power had not increased over time. Zhao et al. (1998)
modi¢ed the model developed by Holloway to account for trade and applied
it to the Australian beef market. When the domestic and export markets
were separated, no evidence was found of non-competitive behaviour in the
domestic beef market. Paul's view of the importance of processing cost
economies is echoed by Rolfe and Reynolds (1999), who argue that for the
Queensland meat processing sector, because of demonstrated large-scale
economies (Morrison 1997), fewer but more e¤cient ¢rms would reduce
processing costs and may increase prices paid for livestock.
A particular area of concern in Australia in recent years has been retail
£uid milk markets, and the extent to which retail prices might change
because of concentration in food retailing following deregulation in the
various states. For the product of primary interest, carton milk, O'Donnell
(1999) found signi¢cant evidence of market power but he was unable to
quantify its precise magnitude or cause.
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Another recent theme of research has been in the time series econometrics
area, where the statistical properties of the major price series in a particular
food chain are examined to infer industry behaviour from market outcomes.
For example, Reed and Clark (1998) used these methods to reach the
conclusion that analysts are more likely to reach a ¢nding of non-competitive
market behaviour if they do not correctly account for the (statistical)
characteristics of the data series they are using. These authors also make the
point that `deciding whether markets are competitive rests not on whether
an industry establishes a gap between price and marginal cost but on whether
the gap is maintained over time and as capital moves in and out of the
sector' (1998, p. 1142).
Goodwin and Holt (1999) were particularly concerned with the causal
direction of US price changes and on whether responses were symmetric to
price rises and price falls. They found uni-directional price transmission,
from farm to wholesale to retail, which does not imply the existence of
market power at higher levels of the chain. They also found that the
responsiveness to price shocks had increased in recent years and they
suggested that this result may imply that markets have become relatively
more e¤cient in transmitting information through vertical marketing
channels.
Similar studies have been conducted for European countries (e.g., Palaskas
1995; Dawson and Ti¡en 1997) with mixed results concerning price causality.
A problem in using these statistical methods in European studies is the
confounding impacts of agricultural policy measures which are in place to
in£uence and supplement farm prices. In Australia, Chang and Gri¤th
(1998) found that the farm, wholesale and retail prices for beef moved
together over time, all responding to exogenous shifts in demand and supply
curves which is evidence in support of competitive price determination.
3.4 Conclusions from the empirical studies
Does the empirical evidence tell us much about the relationship between
concentration levels, consumer prices and prices received by farmers? The
¢rst point to make is that very few empirical studies of the type reviewed
here have been done in the Australian food marketing chain. Three manu-
facturing sector studies done in the 1970s were inconclusive, several studies
of the meat industry have suggested competitive conduct while two studies of
the dairy industry have indicated non-competitive conduct (although there
are policy interactions in this industry). For a broader perspective, we have
to look to studies done in North America and Europe for guidance.
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leader', although that may be changing, so most policy attention has been on
food processing and manufacturing industries. The conclusion drawn from
the older US SCP literature was that the large majority of studies showed a
signi¢cant positive e¡ect of concentration on pro¢ts or margins, and that
this relationship was quite robust across di¡erent time frames, countries,
measures of structure and performance, other variables controlled for, units
of observation, data sets and data sources. Thus, industries which had small
numbers of large ¢rms were more pro¢table than industries which had larger
numbers of small ¢rms. Similar conclusions were made for food retailers.
Conversely, the conclusion drawn from the US NEIO literature is that
no such generalisation is possible. Certainly there is evidence of non-
competitive conduct in some manufacturing industries, but the evidence also
varies with which industry is studied (since there is an element of self-
selection), with de¢nition of market (national or regional) and over time (as
market conditions change). There are several studies which produce opposite
conclusions for the same industry over the same data period.
Kinsey (1998) reviews the evidence about the e¡ect of increased con-
centration in food retailing on consumers. Over forty studies are cited, the
earliest having been published in 1939 and the most recent in 1998. The
results are mixed, especially with regard to the question of whether greater
concentration of retail food ¢rms in local markets increases food prices and
¢rms' pro¢ts. She says:
Concentration tends to be associated with both increased and decreased
prices. Recent work indicates prices tend to increase in dry grocery items,
but not in fresh and chilled foods . . . Pro¢ts of the parent company
generally rise with concentration, but the reason is unclear. Most studies
conclude it is due to lower costs made possible by economies of scale in
procurement or vertical coordination with suppliers and better use of
information technology. There was no evidence that retailers' pro¢ts are
increasing faster than food manufacturers' pro¢ts.
(1998, p. 1)
The more recent study by Park and Weliwite (1999) does conclude that there
is a small but signi¢cant market power premium in US retail food prices.
USDA (1999b) describe recent changes in the `industrialisation' of US
agriculture and conclude that increased concentration may result from
industrialisation but not necessarily so, and high concentration does not
necessarily imply large ¢rm size. Importantly, it is pointed out that `high
concentration can lead to less competition . . . but does not always reduce
competition'. This overview seems consistent with the observations made
above.
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no evidence of non-competitive behaviour in recent years. This could be due
to the evolution of analytical work over time, as more detailed theories and
empirical methods are brought to bear on the problem The recent studies of
Paul (1999a, 1999b) and Muth and Wohlgenant (1999a, 1999b) are in this
mould, and they cast doubt on the long-held view that the US meat
processing industry is non-competitive. There are other explanations, how-
ever. One is to state the obvious ö that ¢rms operate in a dynamic
environment and they are continually reacting and adjusting, not only to
their competitors, but also to supply and demand changes in the external
environment, including changes in the regulatory environment. A greater
regulatory presence in the United States in the 1990s compared to the 1980s
would surely have some in£uence on the strategic directions that ¢rms take
in industries which have a `reputation' for non-competitive behaviour.
In the United Kingdom, the retailing sector tends to be the chain leader,
although that too may be changing, so most policy attention has been on
food retailing. Although the number of published research studies is small,
there has been a recent O¤ce of Fair Trading inquiry and the consensus is
that the major supermarkets do have market power. This matter has been
referred to the Competition Commission. However, there is also evidence
that the degree to which the major supermarkets have been able to exert
market power has varied over time as new competitors have entered the
market and as industry conditions have changed. Thus, barriers to entry are
seen as a very important inhibitor on the ability of ¢rms with market power
to maintain non-competitive behaviour over time.
4. Review of the retailing sector
4.1 General
The Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector which reported in
August 1999 (see Australian Parliament 1999) was asked to inquire into and
report on: (a) the degree of industry concentration within the retailing sector
in Australia, with particular reference to the impact of that industry con-
centration on the ability of small independent retailers to compete fairly in
the retail sector; (b) overseas developments with respect to this issue, high-
lighting approaches adopted in OECD economies; and (c) possible revenue-
neutral courses of action by the Federal Government (i.e. courses of action
that do not involve taxation reform).
The evidence used by the Committee to reach its conclusions and make
its recommendations was a combination of factual data on market shares
and price changes and largely anecdotal evidence about ¢rm conduct derived
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taken as part of the inquiry. There is some mention in the reported sub-
missions and in the discussion of developments in other OECD countries.
Regarding the existence of market power, there is considerable debate in
the Report about how to measure market shares, and such measurements for
mid-1999 for the three major retail chains range from 80 per cent for the
dry/packaged grocery market (AC Neilsen 1999) to 43 per cent for all
food and grocery spending including cafe ¨ s, restaurants, hotels and taverns
(Woolworths 1999). Whichever measure is used, however, the evidence is
that the share of the major chains is growing over time at the expense of the
independents (ABS commissioned research).
The Report takes a strong structural perspective in deciding on the
existence of market power. For example: `the market is heavily concentrated
and oligopolistic in nature, where a small number of major chains
(Woolworths, Coles and Franklins) each have a signi¢cant degree of
economic in£uence or market power' (Australian Parliament 1999, p. x) and
`The Australian grocery retailing industry is oligopolistic in nature. That is,
the market structure is characterised by a small number of ¢rms, each of
which possesses a signi¢cant degree of economic in£uence or market power'
(ibid., paragraph 2.16).
Somewhat inconsistently, given the comments above about an oligopolistic
structure, the major winners from this expansion of market share by the
major chains were said to be consumers, in terms of deregulated trading
hours; a greater product choice; lower prices; and the convenience of one-
stop shopping. The Report stated that:
At the consumer level, competition in the retailing sector appears to be
healthy, with retailers vigorously competing with one another on price and
choice. This is evidenced by declining real prices of many grocery items
over the last decade, and a massive expansion in product range to the
point where major supermarkets now o¡er over 40,000 di¡erent items in
their larger stores.
(Australian Parliament 1999, p. 2)
The Report also recognises that the growth of the chains has led to
signi¢cant economies of size and scope and that these savings have been, at
least in part, passed onto consumers in the form of lower prices. An
implication of this is that market power on the selling side is not a big
issue.
The two groups who have lost from this structural change in food retailing
are the small independent competitors, and in many cases, suppliers. The
National Association of Retail Grocers of Australia (NARGA) has been
concerned that the major chains have increasingly established themselves
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According to the Report, this expansion by the major chains has seen the
demise of hundreds of small grocery stores, butchers, bakers, £orists, green-
grocers, pharmacists, newsagents, liquor outlets and other small retailers as
a result. However, there has been signi¢cant growth in other types of retail
outlets, such as the many forms of convenience stores.
Farmers in particular are concerned that the market power of the major
chains enables them to drive very hard bargains in the purchase of produce,
which is often done in an aggressive manner. Members of some farm
organisations report instances of what they believe to be abuses of market
power, including signi¢cant added costs being imposed on suppliers via
enhanced labelling and packaging requirements; the use of various tactics to
limit the establishment of brand names by suppliers; breaches of contract;
the `£exible' use of quality standards as grounds for product rejection; the
use of what is said to be exclusive supply agency arrangements in certain
markets; and unfair negotiating practices (NFF 1999; QFVG 1999).
4.2 ACCC submission
The ACCC submission to the retail sector inquiry provides a useful
perspective. It points to the changing nature of relationships in the food
marketing chain, emphasising the increased use of contractual arrangements,
and the development of exclusive contracts with producers in particular. It
warns how attempts by supermarkets and manufacturers/processors to earn
higher returns can impact adversely on farmers and notes that the sale of
raw farm products is now more competitive because of the demise of
marketing boards. In relation to whether in fact the supermarket chains have
market power, the submission states as follows:
One preliminary issue is whether in fact it can be said that the chains
indeed have substantial market power. While collectively they are clearly a
signi¢cant voice, individually none of the chains has more than 35 per cent
of the market for warehouse withdrawals. A ¢rm's market power is related
to the structural or behavioural conditions of a market. Whether a ¢rm
has substantial market power in any given case will depend on the
circumstances.
(ACCC 1999, p. 37)
The ACCC goes on to mention a few issues that it claims justify its close
watch over the grocery sector. For example, it is stated that:
An oligopolistic market structure at the wholesale/retail level of the
grocery industry imposes backward pressure on the agricultural and
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sales. This causes pro¢ts to be squeezed at the producer level and, to the
extent that it drives otherwise viable and competitive players out of the
business, results in a misallocation of resources.
(ACCC 1999, p. 37)
While the ACCC points to various dangers of increased concentration in
food retailing, it also points to some of the bene¢ts from growth of the
supermarket chains such as the ability to cater for consumers with varying
income levels, new product development and the convenience of one-stop
shopping.
4.3 Recommendations of the Report
A signi¢cant body of evidence presented to the Committee alleged instances
of predatory pricing, where it was said that the major chains were prepared
to lose money inde¢nitely in certain stores to wipe out the competition.
While the major chains denied these claims, the Committee thought that the
evidence was consistent and widespread, with the common complaint being
that the di¤culties lie in establishing predatory conduct under the current
provisions of the Trade Practices Act. The Committee believed that the
evidence clearly reveals a need to address the issue of predatory pricing,
with a recommendation that the ACCC be given wider powers to bring
representative actions, and to seek damages on behalf of third parties under
Part IV of the Trade Practices Act.
Many complaints received during the course of the inquiry raised issues
not formally covered by the Trade Practices Act. Therefore the Committee
saw the need to establish a mechanism outside the ACCC through which
retail industry participants can bring complaints or queries for speedy
resolution. The Committee believed that an appropriate dispute resolution
mechanism should take the form of an independent Ombudsman, to be
funded by government, who could attempt to resolve all sorts of complaints
brought by businesses in the retailing sector.
The Committee recommended the establishment of a Retail Industry
Ombudsman who would be backed by a mandatory Code of Conduct to
regulate conduct in vertically integrated relationships throughout the supply
chain. Being mandatory, the Code of Conduct would enable the courts to
take into account provisions of the Code in determining whether or not
business conduct has been unlawful.
It was also recommended that the Committee should be reconstituted in
three years time to re-examine the retail sector. All of these recommenda-
tions have since been accepted by the Federal Government (ABC 1999).
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The Productivity Commission's (1999) report on the e¡ects of National
Competition Policy on rural and regional Australia discusses two broad
areas of concern directly related to the topic of this address. First, it reports
concerns on the part of farmers that the dismantling of the marketing board
system that is currently underway is undermining the ability of farmers to
exert countervailing power in their dealings with large corporations. But the
Commission did not view this concern as a reason for slowing down reform
in agricultural marketing. It points out that concentration does not neces-
sarily imply lack of competition in purchasing agricultural products.
Second, it reports concerns about the expansion of retail chains in
country Australia; in particular, that this could result in the demise of
smaller players. But the Commission states that retailing is highly
competitive and quotes from the Access Economics submission to point
to low entry barriers. Moreover, it states that the former Industry
Commission found that pro¢t levels for small and medium food retailing
enterprises in 1993^94 and 1994^95 were higher than for larger enterprises
and this was inconsistent with the notion that large food retailers exercise
signi¢cant market power.
The Commission did not make any speci¢c recommendations with respect
to market power issues, viewing such issues as being the responsibility of
the ACCC. However, it does have a chapter on the topic `National
Competition Policy and the Marketing of Rural Products' that is particularly
instructive about the legislative reform process now underway in relation to
marketing boards. Among other things it emphasises the need for case-by-
case assessment of the bene¢ts and costs associated with marketing boards
as is occurring under national competition policy.
6. Some new empirical results
Given the paucity of empirical evidence on the competitive structure of the
food marketing chain in Australia that is available to assist policy-makers,
an attempt is made here to add to the stock of knowledge. The objectives in
undertaking this research are to take a broad sweep across all sectors from
farm gate to the consumer and across a wide range of fourteen food products
of varying levels of processing; and to use a modelling framework which
was broadly applicable across these products using readily and publicly
available data. It is hoped that the study will provide the sort of ¢lter
requested by ACCC and others, so that detailed case studies on the
competitive structure of the marketing chain do not have to be undertaken
on every single deregulation or merger proposal.
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A marketing margins framework is adopted as the basis for the study, and
of the many alternative models available (recently reviewed by Wohlgenant
1999), the structural NEIO framework developed by O'Donnell (1999) is
used. The idea is that the observed marketing margin for a food product
potentially contains three components. The ¢rst is the costs of providing the
marketing services required to transform the agricultural input into the food
product. The second is any rent due to non-competitive buying behaviour
in the relevant input market, due to any divergence between input price and
marginal factor cost, and the third is any rent due to non-competitive selling
behaviour in the relevant output market, due to any divergence between
price and marginal revenue.
Following the notation set out by O'Donnell, let pm be the price of the
food output m, wm the price of the agricultural input m, qm the aggregate
quantity of output m and xm the aggregate quantity of input m. An inverse
demand function operates in the output market of the form pm  fqm.
Agricultural marketing ¢rms combine agricultural inputs xm, with input
supply functions of the form xm  fwm and non-agricultural inputs z, to
produce qm. Making the common assumptions of ¢xed proportions, and
constant returns to scale (as, for example, Hyde and Perlo¡ 1998), speci¢c
assumptions about functional forms for the demand, supply and cost
functions, and aggregating over all n ¢rms in the industry, the ¢rst order
condition from the pro¢t maximisation problem eventually results in an
estimable equation for the marketing margin of the following form (full
details of the derivation and the estimation model are given in O'Donnell
1999):
mj  aj  S
K
k1cjkzk  bjqj  S
M
m1gjmxm=wm; 1
where, for any product j
mj  pj ÿ wj, is the industry marketing margin;
zj  non-agricultural input prices and trend and seasonal factors if
required;
bj  ÿyqjj=Zj, where Zj is the slope of the market demand function for
product j and
yqjj  the conjectural elasticity of the average ¢rm in the output market
with respect to aggregate output;
gjm=wm  yxmj=ejm, where ejm is the slope of the input supply function for
agricultural input j and yxmj is the conjectural elasticity of the
average ¢rm in the input market with respect to aggregate inputs,
and where there may be more than one input m contributing to
output j.
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also be non-negative.
Thus the industry marketing margin for a food product can be expressed
as a linear function of the prices of marketing inputs and two expressions
containing the quantity of the agricultural input (or output). These latter two
expressions represent output and input market power, respectively. If output
and input markets are competitive, the conjectural elasticities are zero and
the margin equation reduces to the familiar condition of the price of
marketing services equals the marginal cost of supplying them. Thus a test of
competitive behaviour in a particular food product market or agricultural
input market is simply a test of whether the bj and gjm coe¤cients respectively
are positively signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero. No direct estimates of the
conjectural elasticities are provided if these coe¤cients are signi¢cant, but
they can be inferred if estimates are available of the demand and supply
elasticities.
The modelling approach undertaken was to estimate a set of equations of
the form given in equation 1 for the products of interest with the non-
negativity restrictions imposed using the nonlinear regression command in
TSP. Single equations and SUR systems were estimated, with and without a
dummy variable (1987 onwards  1) to try and account for the greater
concern with concentrated markets in the last decade, and using production
data as the measure of throughput. The results reported below are for
the SUR product group systems, without dummy variables, and with an
aggregate cost index in place of individual cost variables because of
multicollinearity problems. The dummy variables did not produce results
much di¡erent from those reported.
6.2 Data
For any one product, the only data required are farm and retail prices, the
quantity produced, the costs of supplying marketing services and the price of
all other goods (CPI) for the normalised cost function. Annual data on these
required variables for the fourteen food products listed in table 1, over the
period 1970 to 1997 where possible, were taken from readily available
sources as detailed in Appendix 1.
3 All price variables were converted to real
terms so the dependent variables in the regressions are real margins. Some
comment is required on the restrictions that data limitations placed on the
analysis, and this is done below.
3Dairy products were included in an earlier version of this article, but have now been
removed due to the extensive regulation of prices of these products over the sample period.
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compared to the equivalent nominal margins. For most of the fourteen food
products, real margins are non-increasing. Further, as shown in Appendix
2, for most of the products the relative variability of these margins is quite
low. Two of the three products which show the highest coe¤cients of
variation are those with strongly declining real margins.
6.3 Results
The results of estimating equation 1 are quite striking (see table 1). First,
there is a large proportion of corner solutions where the constraints on both
the input and output conjecture coe¤cients were binding at zero. Thus the
null hypothesis of a competitive market in both output and input markets
could not be rejected for any of the meat products, fresh fruits or fresh
vegetables.
The result in relation to these output markets matches the conclusions
from the Joint Select Committee noted above and the views of the Prices
Surveillance Authority (PSA 1994), which regarded the markets for meat














Beef 228.5 0.00** 0.00** ÿ0.70
Lamb 23.41 0.00** 0.00** ÿ4.98**
Pork 45.56 0.00** 0.00** ÿ4.31**
Chicken 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** ÿ8.33**
Grains products
Rice 63.73* 0.00** 0.00** ÿ2.57**
Bread 61.62** 0.00** 0.06 (.26) 2.03**
Margarine 230.0** 0.00** 1.70** ÿ8.27**
Breakfast cereal 0.00** 0.00** 1.06 (.21) 9.19**
Fresh fruit
Oranges 39.04 0.00** 0.00** 2.35**
Bananas 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** ÿ1.04
Fresh vegetables
Potatoes 34.36 0.00** 0.00** ÿ0.40
Tomatoes 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** ÿ1.75
Carrots 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** ÿ0.06
Onions 108.9** 0.00** 0.00** 1.55
Note: *signi¢cant at the 10 per cent level, ** signi¢cant at the 5 per cent level,
one-tail test for the potential constrained coe¤cients, two-tailed for the time trend
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previous evidence on meat products (Zhao et al. 1998; Hyde and Perlo¡
1998). The result in relation to input markets is consistent with the evidence
for meat products in Chang and Gri¤th (1998), but is somewhat contrary
Figure 3 Nominal and real beef marketing margins, 1970^97
Figure 4 Nominal and real banana margins, 1979^97
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fresh fruit and vegetable sector.
In the processed grains and oilseeds sector of the food market, the output
conjecture coe¤cients are not positively signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero
and thus indicate a competitive consumer market for the relevant food
products, as suggested by the Joint Select Committee. However, three of the
input conjecture coe¤cients are positive, one is highly signi¢cant and the
other two are signi¢cant at just over the 20 per cent level. This provides some
evidence of a non-competitive buying market for the relevant farm com-
modities. Given the assumptions made, and the fact that the estimated
coe¤cients re£ect average behaviour over a 20-year period, these results
suggest that non-competitive activity has been a persistent feature of this
market sector.
This result also accords with the views of the Prices Surveillance Authority
(PSA 1994), which regarded the markets for products contained in the
Breakfast Cereals and Cooking Oils and Fats indexes as `not e¡ectively
competitive' (p. 14) and consequently maintained price surveillance on the
major ¢rms in this product group (at the time Arnotts, Kelloggs, Uncle
Tobys and Sanitarium).
The high proportion of corner solutions (also found by O'Donnell 1999)
requires comment. The equations were re-estimated without the non-
negativity constraints, and for only two of the products, rice and bread, did
the unconstrained equations produce positive signs on all the coe¤cients
required to be non-negative. It is no surprise that these products are both in
the grains and oilseeds processing sector. In all other cases, at least one of
the quantity-related coe¤cients, and in some cases the cost index coe¤cient
also, was estimated to be negative and signi¢cantly di¡erent from zero.
Therefore, the estimated margins equations strongly suggest a negative
relationship between margins and throughput. This implies a declining
average cost curve for the processing and distribution sector for these food
products, which questions the constant returns to scale assumption. This
adds further weight to the call by Paul (1999a, 1999b) for greater attention
to be paid to underlying cost structures when examining the competitive
nature of the food chain. Of course, more detailed data sets are required for
this, and a broad coverage of food products as undertaken here may no
longer be possible.
Another comment concerns the general signi¢cance of the trend co-
e¤cients. These trends were included to account for factors, apart from those
formally speci¢ed, thought to have an in£uence on the pricing of market
services ö the increased demand by consumers for additional market
services as well as deregulation and take-over and merger activity. The mix
of positive and negative trend coe¤cients suggests that there are di¡erent
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of the market is important.
A ¢nal comment is that studies such as reported here, based on average
representations of market behaviour over some long historical period, may
not be very useful in identifying episodes of non-competitive behaviour in a
timely manner, when required by regulatory authorities. This general problem
with time series-based models suggests that even more attention should be
given to monitoring and understanding the institutional detail of the market
in question, and to attempting to apply those models having variable market
power indexes. If variations in the use of market power can be related to
particular changes in the environment facing the ¢rm or market in the past,
such changes can be taken as leading indicators of possible variations in the
use of market power in the present and in the future.
7. Implications for the profession
The primary implication of the literature review part of the article is that
future research into market power issues in the Australian food market
should be in the form of intensive case studies. These will allow development
of the institutional detail su¤cient to reveal the nature and signi¢cance of
market power in those chains and how and why it ebbs and £ows over time.
However, such resource-hungry analyses cannot be undertaken for every
market faced by a merger or deregulation proposal. The implications of the
empirical part of the article are that (a) attention should be focused on the
supplier side, not on the consumer side of the market (an implication fully
supported in the Joint Select Committee report); and (b) the sector providing
the most likely payo¡s from greater research e¡ort would be the grains and
oilseeds processing and distribution sector. Given these implications are
likely to continue to be relevant into the near term future at least (Australian
Parliament 1999), a suggested research agenda follows.
The ¢rst component is that the preliminary evidence of the potential to
achieve persistent supernormal pro¢ts in the grains and oilseeds marketing
sector needs to be con¢rmed by more detailed case studies. This could be
done by application of the more detailed NEIO techniques, such as the latest
work on the US meat processing industry by Paul (1999a, 1999b) and Muth
and Wohlgenant (1999a, 1999b). These methods incorporate variable market
power indexes, where the degree of market power, if any, is allowed to vary
over time as external in£uences change, and several also allow separation of
operational e¤ciency gains due to scale and scope and technical innovation.
Alternative methods include the new time series models as reviewed above,
and models of non-cooperative games. There have been few applications of
these types of models in food markets (see Koontz et al. 1993) although they
Competition in the food marketing chain 359
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000are more frequently used in other retail markets (Phlips 1998). The choice
of method will depend on the chain characteristics and on the available data.
Baker and Bresnahan (1992) and Hyde and Perlo¡ (1995) examine the
advantages and disadvantages of various methods. However, innovative
collections of ¢rm-level data and `industry' information (from trade maga-
zines and the like) are likely to be required if detailed case studies are to be
completed.
While the preliminary model reported above has examined the food
marketing chain as a single entity, in reality there are many points of
exchange along this chain and this raises some speci¢c research questions. If
there is market power in the chain, where are the available pro¢ts taken? Is
it the major retail chains or the national manufacturers? And to what extent
is this location related to the resource advantages enjoyed by these ¢rms?
Other questions could relate to barriers to entry and exit, the role of IT
innovations and e¤cient consumer response, and the in£uence of past and
present government regulation in determining the competitive structure of
food markets. A more detailed account of these possible research questions
is given in Gri¤th et al. (1999).
One important point to make regarding measurement of market power
concerns the in£uence of trade. Australia is a small country which exports a
signi¢cant share of farm output and imports a smaller but still signi¢cant
share of food requirements. World market prices do matter in the Australian
food chain, and the export parity price can often be regarded as a £oor for
products that have only a minor degree of processing. However, most of the
formal models reviewed have been constructed in the context of the US and
European markets where trade, and the link between domestic and world
prices, is not nearly as important. Any more detailed empirical models
developed to test market power in the Australian domestic market should
properly account for the trade status of the industry being studied.
Another important point concerns the implication from the empirical
work of increasing returns to scale and non-optimal plant sizes in many
industries over the sample period. While this situation seems to be changing
rapidly, especially in meat and milk processing, further research needs to
examine in detail the shape of cost curves and returns to scale in these
industries (Paul 1999a, 1999b).
Even though no evidence across other sectors was found in the empirical
work, the extensive anecdotal evidence on problems with supply contracts
submitted to the Joint Select Committee would seem to be too pervasive to
ignore (see, for example, NFF 1999 and QFVG 1999 as well as many other
submissions). Thus the second component of a research agenda would
examine the issue of supplier contracting as an e¡ective barrier to or
response to non-competitive behaviour by purchasers (see, for example,
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investigate the extent of the use of contracts in Australian farming; the
nature of those contracts; and the desirable features for contracts given the
particular circumstances of Australian agriculture (such as a relatively high
level of climatic risk) relative to overseas contract design experience. Case
studies could be conducted of primary products in which contracts are a
signi¢cant issue, including long-established or emerging industries, and
should include horticultural enterprises since they were the focus of the
above submissions. Some of the questions to be addressed could include: Are
agency problems and information asymmetries important? How should
contracts be designed? Is there a role for grower co-operatives? Are there
viable alternative institutional relationships? As responses to agency and
information problems, why have some cases seen vertical integration,
others franchising and others the outsourcing of speci¢c production tasks
(as in the chicken meat industry)? What role does supply responsiveness
play in a buyer's ability to force down farm-level prices? There would
seem to be scope for more studies of supply response and one focusing on
vegetable crops would be a suitable starting point given that farmer-
supermarket relationships for vegetables have received attention in recent
inquiries.
The ¢nal component of a research agenda relates to data quality and
availability. The issue of data availability has emerged frequently in the
above discussion, particularly in relation to the constraints placed on the use
of preferred methods. In the empirical work reported above, a partial listing
of de¢ciencies in publicly available product-level data would include the
absence of retail prices for some products and short sample periods for
others, absence of wholesale prices for a greater range of products, absence
of farm prices from direct sales, absence of marketing cost indexes,
inconsistencies in data availability between calendar and ¢nancial years, and
the use of ¢xed proportions assumptions to calculate prices and quantities
at various market levels. Equally important are de¢ciencies in sector-level
data, such as the absence of concentration ratios on a consistent basis,
absence of manufacturing industry data in markets where there are only a
few ¢rms (as con¢dentiality provisions prevent publication), and absence of
¢rm-level data in those industries of interest.
Thus, on the one hand, we have greater legislative requirements on
government agencies to consider the competitive behaviour of food markets,
calls for economists to contribute more to these enquiries by undertaking
research, and developments in empirical methods which require more dis-
aggregated data series. On the other, we have a public data collection and
distribution system which is being continually wound back, and con¢denti-
ality restrictions preventing the publication of data which are likely to be
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same data being more commonly released in annual reports and the like).
These developments are increasingly constraining the ability of economists
to make any empirical contribution. And it is somewhat ironic that the
grains and oilseeds processing and marketing sector, the one sector suggested
by the preliminary empirical work as de¢nitely worthy of closer scrutiny, is
one of the sectors where the available data are most restricted.
This situation is in stark contrast to that in other countries where market
information is treated as a more valuable commodity. As a case in point, in
the United States there is a growing number of ¢rm level data sets (Paul
1999b), there are concentration ratios published for a very wide range
of quite disaggregated products (down to the level of `Canned olives,
incl. stu¡ed') (Rogers and Sexton 1994, Table 1, though con¢dentiality
restrictions can prevent publication of census data at the local and regional
level), and legislation has recently been passed to require the reporting of all
direct-to-plant livestock sales as well as a range of other enhancements to
market reporting (NSW Farmers Association 1998). The situation is also in
contrast to recent pronouncements of safeguards following implementation
of the National Competition Policy (PSA 1994, p. 1): `Prices surveillance will
remain an integral part of the new competition regime.' Members of the
profession can have a signi¢cant role here in pointing out the value of public
data collection services which have extensive uses in public policy debates
as well as contributing their analytical expertise to these debates.
So there are some ideas for further research in the general area of
competition in the Australian food marketing chain. There are likely to be
many others as well, but as a wiser person once said, `There's enough to be
getting on with'.
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General data
Consumer Price Index, Australia, all groups, base 1980/81, both calendar year
and ¢nancial year, both rebased to 1990, ABS 6401.0 and ABARE.
Population, Australia, million, both calendar year and ¢nancial year, ABS and
ABARE.
Wages Index, Australia, all adults weekly, base 1980/81, both calendar year and
¢nancial year, both rebased to 1990, ABS.
Interest rate, Australia, 90 day bank bills, ¢nancial year, calendar year calculated,
ABARE. Electricity cost index, Australia, base 1990, ¢nancial year, calendar year
calculated, ABS 6411.0.
Marketing cost index, calculated as (0.75* Wage) + (0.1* Electricity) + (0.15*
Interest), both calendar and ¢nancial year, base 1990.
Meat products data
Retail prices for meat, c/kg, calendar year, ABARE.
Farm prices for livestock except chicken, c/kg, calendar year, ABARE.
Farm price for chicken, average unit gross value of livestock slaughterings,
poultry, ¢nancial year, A$ per bird, converted to c/kg by average carcase weight
and to calendar year, ABS 7503.0.
Production and aggregate domestic consumption, kt carcase weight, calendar year,
ABARE and MLA.
Meat models estimated on a calendar year basis.
Grains and oilseeds products data
Retail prices, price for various pack sizes converted to c/kg, converted to ¢nancial
year, ABARE and ABS 6403.0.
Farm prices, unit gross value of production, A$/t converted to c/kg, ¢nancial year,
ABARE and ABS 7503.0.
Production and aggregate domestic consumption, kt, ¢nancial year, ABARE (no
reliable consumption data for rice or maize).
Grains and oilseeds models estimated on a ¢nancial year basis.
Fresh fruit and vegetable data
Retail prices, c/kg, ¢nancial year, ABARE and ABS 6403.0.
Farm prices, average unit gross value of principal crops, A$/t converted to c/kg,
¢nancial year, ABS 7503.0.
Production, kt, ¢nancial year, ABARE and ABS 7503.0.
Aggregate domestic consumption, apparent per capita consumption, kg/head,
¢nancial year, converted to aggregate consumption, ABARE and ABS Fruits
Australia.
Fruits and vegetables models estimated on a ¢nancial year basis.
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